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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951-52 TERM
I. ADmnTsITRATIvF LAw
In its 1951-52 term, the Court of Appeals dealt with several
phases of the administrative process, including the role played by
the courts. At-the outset, it was faced with a basic problem of this
branch of law, the proscription against statutory delegation of
legislative power to an administrative body.' The next step, i. e.,
the actual administration of the statute by the tribunal or officer,
is guided by the reqiirements of due process.2 Decisions of the
Court in the past term accentuate the fact that procedure must be
proper and in precise'compliance with the statutory scheme.' On
appeal, although the litigant has properly proceeded before the
agency, he may nevertheless experience great difficulty in invoking
th jurisdiction of a court to review the administrative action.4 If
jurisdiction is granted, the courts of this state find statutory as
well as decisional rules governing the scope of review.0
Delegation
Delegation of power to an administrative agency must not be
delegation of legislative power." The function of the agency must
be restricted to ascertaining facts and conditions to which the
statute will apply.7 The policy of the law must be set by the
legislature,8 and the statute must supply the methods to be used
in carrying out such policy and the objectives which are to be
attained; such standards are to guide the agency in administering
the statute. In the now famous Miracle case, 0 EDUOATIO LAW
§ 122 was involved. It provides that a license should be issued
for the exhibition of any submitted film "unless such film or a
part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious,
or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
1. Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665 (1951).
2. Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435, 103 N. E. 2d 728 (1952).
3. Weeks v. O'Connell, 304 N. Y. 259, 107 N. E. 2d 290 (1952).
4. Brennan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 303 N. Y. 907, 105 N. E. 2d 492 (1952).
5. Lynch Builders Restaurant v. O'Connell, 303 N. Y. 408, 103 N. E. 2d 531(1952); Kopec v. Buffalo Brake Beam-Acme Steel & Malleable Iron Works, 304 N. Y.
65, 106 N. E. 2d 12 (1952).
6. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S.-649 (1892).
7. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944).
8. Iid.
9. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
10. Supra a 1.
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morals or incite to crime." The license should issue from the
Motion Picture Division of the Department of Education of the
State of New York; consequently, the denial of a license would be
based upon a determination by the Motion Picture Division that
the film violated one of the proscriptions of the statute. In No-
vember, 1950, petitioner secured a license to show the film, "The
Miracle". The first showing was in New York City during De-
cember of the same year. The film immediately provoked expres-
sions of public opinion, and the Board of Regents, which is
head of the Department of Education, promptly proceeded to
review the action of the Motion Picture Division, which granted
the license. A sub-committee, appointed by the Board, found that
possibly the film should not have been licensed and recom-
mended that the Board view the film and review the record. Fo1-
lowing the recommendation, the Board of Regents unanimously
rescinded and cancelled the license, upon its determination that
"The Miracle" is "sacrilegious" and not entitled to a license under
law. Whereupon, the licensee instituted a proceeding for review.
Petitioner contended that the statute delegates legislative
power without adequate standards and attacked specifically the
word "sacrilegious" for its indefiniteness. The Court of Appeals
held (5-2) that there was no problem with the word "sacrilegious"
and stated that were it necessary, the dictionary furnishes a clear
definition.1  Reliance was placed upon Mutual Film Corp. of
Missouri v. Hodges, 2 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld a statute providing that a censor should approve
such films as were found to be "moral and proper" and disap-
prove such as are "sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral, or
such as tend to corrupt the morals." The court in the instant case
went on to show that the word "profane", which is considered a
synonym for "sacrilegious", had also been upheld.'3
Though the Court had little difficulty with this objection and
felt that a "short answer" would suffice,'4 its position is far from
unassailable. The Mutual Film case, upon which the court relied,
dealt with similar statute but did not concern itself particularly
with the word "sacrilegious".- The specific objection in that case
was to a different part of the statutory language.' 5 Also, the
11. "The act of violating or profaning anything sacred," FuNK & WAGxAI's NEw
STA A DU Dicrio cAY (1937 ed.).
12. 236 U. S. 248 (1915).
13. Chaplin-sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
14. 303 N. Y. 242, 255, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 670.
15. The first part of the statute disclosed which type films could be licensed. The
specific woids under attack were "educational," "moral," "amusing," and "harmless."
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lengthy concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and
Burton, in the U. S. Supreme Court decision of the Miracle case,"0
is devoted entirely to showing the inherent vagueness of the word
"sacrilegious". Besides tracing historically the various meanings
ascribed to the word and the resulting confusion, the appendix to
the opinion contains quotations from over thirty dictionaries,
which show that dictionary definitions of the word differ and that
no clear meaning may be derived therefrom.
Other Aspects of the Miracle Case
Because of the importance of, and intense interest in, the case
now under consideration, further issues in the case will be dis-
cussed at this point. Petitioner advanced the contention that
EDUcATIoxq LAw §122 is unconstitutional as a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, in that
the licensing scheme interferes with religious liberty. In refuta-
tion, the Court of Appeals relied on the proposition that freedom
of religion is not an absolute right. It pointed out that a statute
which has a legitimate objective within the police power of the
state is not unconstitutional though it constitutes some restraint
on the free exercise of religion.'1 The statute promotes the public
welfare, morals, peace and order. "These are the traditionally
recognized objects of the exercise of police power," said the
court. 8 Further, a state may protect religious beliefs from
private or commercial attacks and prevent offenses to decency and
morals even though there be incidental benefit to religion, or a
religion, if this be the case here.' 9
The other major issue in the case arose through the objection
that the statute is unconstitutional in toto as a prior restraint on
the freedoms of speech and press; that films should be included
within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
as a means of expression of ideas. The Court of Appeals relied
squarely upon the Mutual Film case, and refused to accept the
contention that technical developments have changed the essential
nature of movies since the time of the Mutual Film decision. The
rationale of this position is that movies are primarily a form of
commercial entertainment, rather than a means of expression, and
as such can be regulated.
16. 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
18. 303 N. Y. 242, 259, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672.
19. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
